Russia

Russia sprawls across eleven time zones, from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the Arctic to Central Asia. It is the Heartland power that Mackinder warned about—a continental empire that has repeatedly challenged the maritime world order. Understanding Russia requires understanding its geography, which has shaped a strategic culture of insecurity, expansion, and great power ambition.

Geographic Foundations¶

The Northern Eurasian Plain¶

Russia’s heartland is the great northern European plain stretching from Poland to the Urals:

• Flat, featureless terrain offering no natural defensive barriers
• Historically the invasion route for Mongols, Poles, Swedes, French, and Germans
• Contains Moscow and the industrial centers of western Russia
• The region Russia has most desperately sought to defend—and to buffer

This geographic vulnerability explains much of Russian strategic behavior.

The Natural Boundaries¶

Russia has expanded to reach defensible positions:

• West: The Carpathians, the Baltic, the Polish borderlands (never fully secure)
• South: The Caucasus mountains, the Black Sea, Central Asian deserts
• East: The Pacific Ocean and the vast emptiness of Siberia
• North: The Arctic (once a frozen barrier, now increasingly accessible)

Russian history can be read as the pursuit of these boundaries—and the struggle to hold them.

The Warm Water Quest¶

Russia’s defining geographic frustration is limited access to open seas:

• Baltic: Narrow, controlled by Danish straits, freezes in winter
• Black Sea: Enclosed, requiring passage through the Turkish-controlled Bosphorus
• Pacific: Vladivostok is ice-bound in winter; access requires passage near Japan
• Arctic: Frozen for most of the year (though climate change is altering this)

The quest for warm water ports—in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean—has driven Russian expansion for centuries.

Historical Patterns¶

Expansion and Contraction¶

Russian history oscillates between expansion and collapse:

• Muscovy to Empire (1500-1917): Expansion from a small principality to the world’s largest land empire
• Revolution and Civil War (1917-1922): Collapse and reconstitution as the Soviet Union
• Soviet Expansion (1945-1989): Control over Eastern Europe, influence worldwide
• Post-Soviet Collapse (1991): Loss of empire, economic devastation, demographic decline
• Putin’s Restoration (2000-present): Reassertion of great power status, territorial revisionism

The current period represents another expansionist phase after the post-Soviet contraction.

Buffer State Obsession¶

Russia has historically sought buffer zones:

• The Eastern European satellites during the Cold War
• The “near abroad” of post-Soviet states
• Resistance to NATO expansion as Western encroachment on the buffer

When Russia is strong, it expands buffers outward. When Russia is weak, buffers contract inward—exposing the vulnerable core.

The Western Threat Perception¶

Russia perceives the West as an existential threat:

• Memories of Napoleon’s invasion, the Crimean War, World War I, the Allied intervention in the Civil War, and Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa
• NATO expansion interpreted as encirclement
• Western promotion of democracy seen as regime change
• Economic sanctions experienced as economic warfare

Whether these perceptions are justified or paranoid (or both), they shape Russian behavior.

Strategic Culture¶

Defensive Aggression¶

Russian strategy often involves offensive operations for defensive purposes:

• Buffer states are acquired to protect the core
• Adversaries are weakened before they can threaten Russia
• First-strike advantages are valued given geographic vulnerability

This logic can lead to behavior that appears aggressive to others but feels defensive to Russians.

Geopolitical Realism¶

Russian foreign policy tends toward hard-nosed realism:

• Skepticism about international institutions and norms
• Emphasis on spheres of influence
• Military power as the ultimate arbiter
• Willingness to use force when interests demand

Putin’s worldview reflects classical great power politics, not post-Cold War liberal internationalism.

Tolerance for Suffering¶

Russian strategic culture accepts costs that would be intolerable to Western democracies:

• Massive casualties in war (27 million Soviet dead in WWII)
• Economic deprivation in pursuit of strategic goals
• Authoritarian governance justified by external threats

This tolerance can be a strategic advantage—but it also reflects a society where rulers historically cared little for subjects’ welfare.

Military Capabilities¶

Nuclear Arsenal¶

Russia possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal:

• Approximately 6,000 warheads
• Triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers
• Tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use
• Modernization programs updating delivery systems

Nuclear weapons are Russia’s ultimate guarantee against existential threats—and a means of compensating for conventional weakness.

Conventional Forces¶

The Russian military combines strengths and weaknesses:

Strengths: - Large ground forces with combat experience (Syria, Ukraine) - Advanced air defense systems (S-400) - Electronic warfare capabilities - Missile forces (cruise and ballistic)

Weaknesses: - Logistics and sustainment limitations (exposed in Ukraine) - Corruption and maintenance issues - Demographic constraints on manpower - Technology gaps with the West in some areas

The Ukraine war has revealed both capabilities and severe limitations.

Asymmetric Tools¶

Russia employs tools below the threshold of conventional war:

• Cyber operations: Hacking, disinformation, infrastructure attacks
• Information warfare: Propaganda, social media manipulation
• Private military companies: Wagner Group and others providing deniable force
• Political interference: Election meddling, support for extremist parties

These tools allow Russia to compete with better-resourced adversaries.

The Ukraine War¶

Origins¶

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine followed years of tension:

• The 2014 seizure of Crimea and intervention in Donbas
• Ukrainian movement toward Western integration
• Russian demands for NATO non-expansion guarantees
• The decision to launch full-scale invasion in February 2022

The Conflict¶

The war has proven far more difficult than Russia anticipated:

• Ukrainian resistance far exceeded expectations
• Western arms and sanctions have supported Ukraine
• Russian military has suffered enormous losses
• Neither side has achieved decisive victory

Implications¶

The war has transformed geopolitics:

• NATO has expanded (Finland, Sweden) rather than contracted
• European states have increased defense spending
• Russia has become more dependent on China
• The post-Cold War security order in Europe has collapsed

The war’s outcome will shape the international system for decades.

Key Relationships¶

The United States¶

The central adversarial relationship:

• Nuclear deterrence remains mutual
• Competition across Europe, Middle East, and beyond
• Arms control framework has collapsed
• Ukraine as the main arena of confrontation

Periods of attempted reset have consistently failed.

China¶

Partnership of convenience against American hegemony:

• Energy trade (Russian oil and gas to China)
• Military technology sharing
• Diplomatic coordination
• But not a formal alliance—and China is the dominant partner

Russia’s dependence on China has increased dramatically since 2022.

Europe¶

Complex and deteriorating:

• Economic interdependence (energy, trade) has fractured
• Security relations are now purely adversarial
• The post-Cold War project of integrating Russia has failed
• Frontline states (Poland, Baltics) view Russia as existential threat

The “Near Abroad”¶

Russia seeks influence over former Soviet states:

• Belarus is effectively a dependency
• Central Asian states balance between Russia, China, and the West
• The Caucasus remains contested (Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan)
• Ukraine is the decisive battleground

Future Trajectories¶

Best Case (from Western perspective)¶

• Stalemate in Ukraine leads to negotiated settlement
• Russian power gradually declines due to economic and demographic factors
• Post-Putin transition opens possibilities for change
• Managed competition replaces confrontation

Worst Case¶

• Escalation in Ukraine, potentially involving nuclear weapons
• Russia achieves objectives and pursues further revisionism
• Alliance with China solidifies into anti-Western bloc
• Permanent confrontation with growing risk of major war

Most Likely¶

• Prolonged conflict in Ukraine with uncertain outcome
• Russia weakened but not transformed
• Continued adversarial relationship with the West
• Gradual shift toward junior partnership with China

Conclusion¶

Russia cannot be understood without understanding its geography. The flat northern plain, the absence of natural barriers, the quest for warm water ports, the historical experience of invasion—all have shaped a strategic culture of insecurity, expansion, and great power assertion.

The current moment represents Russia’s attempt to reverse the post-Cold War contraction—to push buffers outward and restore something of the Soviet sphere of influence. Whether this attempt succeeds or fails, the underlying geographic realities will persist.

Russia will remain a major power due to its nuclear arsenal, natural resources, and geographic extent. But it is a declining power relative to the United States and China. How Russia manages this decline—whether through accommodation, confrontation, or something between—is one of the central questions of contemporary geopolitics.

The Heartland power that Mackinder identified over a century ago remains a central actor in world affairs. Understanding Russia’s geographic imperatives and strategic culture is essential for anticipating its behavior and managing the risks it poses.