What began as a Goldman Sachs analyst’s acronym has become a significant force in international politics. BRICS—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—represents a grouping of major emerging economies that together account for roughly 45% of the world’s population and nearly a third of global GDP. The bloc has evolved from an investment category into a platform for challenging Western institutional dominance and articulating alternative visions of world order.
Origins and Evolution¶
The BRIC concept emerged in 2001 when Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term to identify emerging markets with exceptional growth prospects. The idea was analytical rather than political: Brazil, Russia, India, and China shared high growth rates, large populations, and expanding economic weight, making them attractive investment destinations.
Formalization began in 2006 when the four countries’ foreign ministers met on the margins of the UN General Assembly. Annual summits commenced in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2010, adding the “S” and a foothold in Africa.
Institutional development followed. The New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 and headquartered in Shanghai, provides an alternative to the World Bank for infrastructure financing. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), with $100 billion in commitments, offers emergency liquidity support outside the IMF.
The 2024 expansion marked a new phase. Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE joined as full members. Additional countries received “partner” status, with more expected to follow. This growth reflects both BRICS’ increased attractiveness and its ambition to represent the Global South more broadly.
What BRICS Is—and Isn’t¶
Understanding BRICS requires recognizing what the grouping does and does not represent:
BRICS is a platform, not an alliance. Members pursue independent foreign policies and often have conflicting interests. India and China contested border territory with fatal skirmishes in 2020; Russia’s Ukraine invasion has complicated relations with all partners; Brazil’s positions shift with its government.
BRICS is a challenge to Western hegemony, not a unified alternative. Members agree that the post-1945 international order reflects outdated power distributions and excludes their voices. They disagree about what should replace it. China seeks a sphere of influence; India resists Chinese dominance; Russia wants to break Western unity; Brazil seeks recognition without confrontation.
BRICS offers a venue for coordination without binding commitments. Annual summits produce declarations and initiatives, but implementation depends on members’ individual choices. The grouping enables consultation and signals shared direction without the constraints of formal alliance.
The De-dollarization Agenda¶
Perhaps BRICS’ most significant initiative concerns currency and finance:
Dollar dependence creates vulnerabilities for countries subject to American sanctions or concerned about American financial surveillance. Dollar-denominated transactions flow through American-regulated banks and can be blocked by sanctions. The currency’s dominance gives Washington unique leverage.
Alternative payment systems aim to reduce this dependence. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), Russia’s SPFS, and discussions of BRICS-linked payment mechanisms all seek to create options outside Western-controlled infrastructure.
Local currency trade between BRICS members reduces dollar transactions. Russia and China increasingly settle bilateral trade in yuan and rubles; India and Russia explore rupee-based trade. These arrangements are growing but remain small relative to dollar-based commerce.
A BRICS currency has been discussed but faces fundamental obstacles. A common currency requires economic convergence, supranational institutions, and political integration that members are nowhere near achieving. More realistic are trade settlement mechanisms that allow bilateral exchange without dollar intermediation.
The significance of these efforts lies not in imminent dollar displacement but in the gradual development of alternatives that reduce American financial leverage over time.
The New Development Bank¶
The NDB embodies BRICS’ institutional ambition:
Governance structure departed from Bretton Woods models. Each founding member holds equal voting shares (unlike the IMF where voting reflects economic weight). No single country has veto power. Leadership rotates among members.
Lending priorities focus on infrastructure and sustainable development. Two-thirds of financing targets renewable energy and climate-related projects. Green bonds issued in yuan, dollars, and member currencies fund operations.
Local currency lending allows borrowing in member countries’ currencies rather than dollars alone, reducing exchange rate risk and supporting domestic capital markets.
Membership expansion has included Bangladesh, UAE, Egypt, and others, with Uruguay, Algeria, and additional countries expressing interest.
Challenges include capital constraints as the portfolio grows, geopolitical complications (Russia’s suspension from new lending following the Ukraine invasion), and the difficulty of maintaining institutional coherence as membership expands.
Internal Tensions¶
BRICS’ diversity is both strength and weakness:
China dominates economically, with GDP exceeding the other four founding members combined. This creates imbalance: other members seek a platform for their own voices, not a Chinese-led bloc. India particularly resists arrangements that formalize Chinese preeminence.
Russia’s pariah status following the Ukraine invasion complicates BRICS positioning. Western sanctions against Russia test members’ willingness to provide alternatives; solidarity with Moscow risks secondary sanctions and reputational costs. Most BRICS members have avoided taking sides while quietly maintaining economic ties.
India-China rivalry persists despite BRICS cooperation. Border disputes remain unresolved; competition for influence in South and Southeast Asia continues; India’s participation in the Quad (with the United States, Japan, and Australia) reflects hedging against Chinese power.
Democratic divergence among members ranges from Brazil and South Africa’s democracies to China and Russia’s authoritarianism, with India increasingly contested. This complicates any values-based identity for the grouping.
Economic complementarity is limited. China competes with Brazil in manufacturing; Russia competes with other energy exporters; India and China vie for similar markets. BRICS members sometimes have more in common with Western trading partners than with each other.
Geopolitical Significance¶
BRICS’ importance lies in several dimensions:
Voice aggregation allows emerging economies to coordinate positions at the G20, in UN forums, and in global negotiations. A common front—even an imperfect one—carries more weight than individual advocacy.
Alternative institutional development gradually creates options outside Western-dominated systems. The NDB, BRICS payment discussions, and expanded membership all build infrastructure for a multipolar order.
Signal to the West demonstrates that American and European dominance of international institutions is contestable. The expansion of BRICS, the interest of dozens of countries in joining, and the attention the bloc receives all indicate shifting legitimacy.
Platform for middle powers provides countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa with a grouping where they are principals rather than junior partners to Western powers.
The Expanded BRICS¶
The 2024 enlargement changes BRICS’ character:
Geographic reach now spans major regions: Latin America (Brazil), Africa (South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia), the Middle East (Iran, UAE), and Asia (China, India, Russia). This breadth supports claims to represent the Global South.
Economic weight increases with additional members, though new entrants are smaller than founding members. Saudi Arabia’s potential future membership would add significant energy sector weight.
Coherence challenges multiply with diversity. The original BRICS already struggled to find common ground; adding members with their own interests and priorities complicates consensus further.
Western concern grows as BRICS expands. A grouping that coordinates positions, develops institutional alternatives, and attracts countries worldwide challenges American and European influence even without military alliance characteristics.
Future Trajectory¶
Several scenarios might unfold:
Deepening institutionalization could see the NDB expand lending capacity, BRICS payment mechanisms mature, and coordination mechanisms strengthen. This would gradually create meaningful alternatives to Western-dominated systems.
Fragmentation might result from internal tensions—particularly India-China rivalry or divergent responses to Russian pariah status. BRICS could become a hollow shell, hosting summits that produce little.
Selective cooperation represents the middle path: useful coordination on some issues, managed disagreement on others, gradual institutional development without dramatic integration. This seems the most likely trajectory.
BRICS reflects a world where American hegemony is contested, emerging economies demand voice, and alternatives to Western-dominated institutions are being built—slowly, imperfectly, but persistently. Whether the grouping becomes a pillar of new world order or a footnote in the history of transitional arrangements remains to be determined.